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ISLAMIC POSITIVISM AND SCIENTIFIC TRUTH 
Qur’an and Archeology in a Creationist Documentary Film1 
Baudouin Dupret 
Clémentine Gutron 
Creationism is a religious doctrine that claims that the world is God’s creation. “Scientific 
creationism” is a theory according to which the study of the origins of the natural and social 
worlds proves that they are not the product of evolution but of divine work. This theory has 
taken variegated forms which are function of the religious contexts of their formulation, among 
other things. Most of these forms share reject Darwinism, often understood in its truncated 
vulgate and its abusive social extension, but are not limited to this anti-evolutionist stance. The 
ambition of some of them is to prove that science, far from contradicting and opposing religion, 
actually confirms it. This is especially true in the case of Muslim creationism and its claim to 
Qur'an foreknowledge. In this perspective, creationism adopts a syllogistic type: divine 
revelation is truth; good science confirms truth; divine revelation is henceforth scientifically 
proven. Two truth orders are simultaneously mobilized and their convergence leads to their 
reciprocal reinforcement. 
Adnan Oktar, alias Harun Yahya, is a prominent Muslim “creationist” figure, a predicate 
justified by his publication in 2006 of an Atlas of Creation, which was largely distributed in 
Europe and North America, and was condemned by the scientific and educational communities. 
His website hosts many texts and documentary films dealing with varied topics, stretching from 
natural sciences to social issues, via history and archeology. Among the documentary films, 
one finds “Evidence of the true faith in historical sources”, which is the object of our analysis.2 
                                                     
1 We are deeply indebted to Michael Lynch and Philippe Gonzalez for their generous, relevant and thorough 
critical reactions and comments to an early draft of this article. 
2 http://en.harunyahya.net/evidence-for-the-true-faith-in-historical-sources-video-harun-yahya-documentaries/ 
This is a small audiovisual production which, starting from some archeological files, seeks to 
demonstrate that Qur’an truth precedes science but is equally confirmed by it. 
In this paper, we are not as much interested in demonstrating the falsity of creationist theses 
as in unpacking its argumentative mechanisms. In other words, it is not the truth value of the 
statements which is of prime interest for us but rather their capacity to produce a truth effect. 
We examine the organization of the scientific and religious argumentative repertoires and, in 
particular, what each of them takes as evidence and uses to gain an authoritative status. We also 
discuss how these repertoires draw upon, affect, and surreptitiously shift from one to another 
so as to reinforce their respective evidentiary power. It leads us to show how much this type of 
Muslim creationism constitutes a kind of scientism. 
In order to argue along these lines, we examine in the first section the manner in which the 
relationship between religion and science was discussed in general before turning to this 
relationship in the Muslim context in particular. Then we describe different accommodation 
perspectives and we specifically present the case of Harun Yahya, the author of the 
documentary. In the second section, we go into the details of the latter’s script and the textual-
visual organization of the four historical chapters and their archeological evidence: Kingdom 
of Ebla’s tablets, Abraham’s documents in Mount Nimrod, the Seven plagues of Egypt, and 
Pharaoh’s crossing of the Red Sea. The third section is devoted to the lexicon of truth and reality 
which is used in the documentary, as well as the many techniques which are used in it so as to 
give its general claim an authoritative status: grammar, sequentiality, organization of the 
narrative, intertwining of different voices (e.g. expert opinion), categorization devices, choice 
of pictures. In the concluding section, we discuss the way in which this kind of Muslim 
creationism organizes religious and scientific truths in a cumulative, redundant way. We show 
how it can be considered as a type of scientism, denying the autonomy of the magister of science 
and religion.  
Just one word regarding the study of archeology before turning to Islamic intelligent design 
and the movie we selected in order to investigate creationist reasoning in action. The social 
study of archeology is a very specific case, since this science is an affiliate of both the natural 
and the human sciences. Archeology constitutes a paradigmatic case and a perspicuous setting 
for an inquiry into the practical use of scientific techniques and methods (e.g. Goodwin 2002) 
in order to make sense of past human activities (e.g. Latour and Lemonnier 1994). The material 
nature of archeological documents gives them the authority of authentic evidence, although the 
social nature of archeological inquiry compels it to borrow its sociological concepts from 
ethnology and history (Testart 2012: 150-197). According to Silberman (2008: 182), “any 
archeological statement–on a fact or a fiction–is also necessarily a statement of identity”, which 
means that a claim regarding the past of a society has a direct impact on the ways in which it 
conceives of itself. This combination of natural and human sciences makes of archeology a 
most performing and even performative tool in a variety of legitimizing processes: nationalism 
(e.g. Diaz-Andreu and Champion 1996, Graves-Brown, Jones, Gramble 1996, Kohl, Kozelsk, 
Ben-Yehuda 2007); colonialism (e.g. Fawcett, Habu, Mastunaga 2008); racism (e.g. Gosden 
2006, MacEachern 2006). Its motivation is sometimes ambiguous, as in the well-known case 
of Israeli archeology (e.g. Silberman 1993, Abu el-Haj 1998, Meskell 1998). Archeology was 
also often mobilized for religious reasons, so as to give scientific ground to statements 
originating in holy scriptures. Biblical and Jewish fundamentalist archeology are good 
examples of this use of the archeological science for religious purposes (e.g. Davis 2004). 
The social study of archeology was concerned with what it calls the “abduction” of a 
scientific discourse for non-scientific purposes (e.g. Le Quellec 2009). Contrary to scholars 
militating for the scientificity of their discipline, who are interested in sorting out what is true 
and wrong in this type of archeological narratives (e.g. Adam 1975), research in the epistemic 
practices within archeology is concerned with what makes archeology scientific for 
professional archeologists, what is constitutive of archeology for non-archeologists, what it is 
that makes something archeological for laypeople, what are the non-archeological purposes 
which can drive archeological arguments, and what are the (official and discrete) relationships 
between professional and naïve archeology (e.g. Stoczkowski 2000, Gutron 2011). 
An Islamic Version of Creationism 
The relationship between religion and science has a long, chaotic, conflicting history, 
although it was not before the 19th century that emerged the discourse pitting the one against 
the other (Shapin 1996, Ferngren 2002, Numbers 2009). To put it roughly, the debate turns 
around the issue of whether these truth programs complement, parallel, co-exist or contradict 
each other (Gould 1999, Stace 1952, Plantinga 2007).  
Within Christian societies, there were historical controversies, which led to some of the most 
famous trials of the Inquisition, like Galileo’s (Sharratt 1994). While initially opposing and 
even prosecuting what sounded contrary to its dogma and reading of the Holy Scriptures, the 
Catholic Church progressively and partially adapted its teaching, and eventually offered a 
nuanced version of separate, non-overlapping though not contradicting spheres. To put it in a 
nutshell, it might be said that the power of scientific discourse forced the Church to adapt its 
dogma towards “concordism”, that is, the principle that religion and science do not oppose each 
other. Pope John Paul II addressing the Pontifical Academy of Science (1981), said: “The Bible 
itself speaks to us of the origin of the universe and its make-up, not in order to provide us with 
a scientific treatise, but in order to state the correct relationships of man with God and with the 
universe. Sacred Scripture wishes simply to declare that the world was created by God, and in 
order to teach this truth it expresses itself in the terms of the cosmology in use at the time of the 
writer”. Scientific discoveries from the 17th century onward forced human weltanschauung to 
adapt, albeit in a different way, as the relationship between man and nature, and this led to 
major theological shifts. Theism is one of this process’ offshots, which combines religious 
teachings and modern science findings (Collins 2007).  
It is mainly the theory of evolution that still stirs controversy between religion and science. 
Biological evolution is the main topic on which the public’s religious reasons specifically 
oppose scientific consensus (Masci 2011).3 Most literalist interpretations of the Scriptures lead 
to stating the incompatibility between Darwinism and Christian creationism, i.e., the contention 
that the world originates in creation as presented in the Genesis narrative. Scientific creationism 
is the branch of creationism that strives to provide scientific support for this thesis (Numbers 
2006, Plavcan 2007). Intelligent design is the creationist theory according to which “certain 
features of the universe and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause, not an 
undirected process such as natural selection” (IDEAC 2004). In its present use, the term 
“intelligent design” was devised to escape the US Supreme Court’s 1997 Edward v. Aguillard 
decision, which barred the teaching of creationism theories in public schools. ID theory is 
sometimes described as a “God-of-the-gaps” argument, which stresses the gaps in scientific 
knowledge and fills them with acts of God (the intelligent Designer) (Ratzsch 2010), although 
it does not specify what the latter is and to what extent the account of the Genesis should be 
treated in a literal way. According to its opponents, it is an argument from ignorance that 
wrongly uses the lack of evidence for one theory in order to prove the correctness of another 
theory.4 It is indeed in the gaps in positive scientific knowledge, which are bridged or filled by 
theories and speculative hypotheses,5 that “scientific creationism” proposes its alternate 
explanation, leaving intact what in science is now considered as a fact. 
                                                     
3 Although more recently so called Young Earth views also target geology and cosmology. 
4 For a perspicuous investigation of Evangelism and its attitude vis-à-vis science, see Gonzalez and Stavo-
Debauge (2015). 
5 As Drury (1973: 102) nicely puts it, in his Wittgensteinian way, there is no need for a theory when factual 
certainty is achieved. A theory is an interpretive means that gives a hypothetical explanation to something still 
partly or wholly ignored. 
When turning to Islamic thought and history, it appears that the issue of the relationship 
between science and religion is old, complex and controversial. The very term of “science” 
deserves to be qualified as to its use for speaking of pre-modern times, but this is not what is at 
stake here. It is nowadays common knowledge to claim that the Islamic Golden Age witnessed 
the flourishing of various sciences like astronomy, algebra, geography, geometry and medicine, 
and eventually greatly inspired modern science through the introduction of empirical and 
experimental methods of inquiry (Grant 1996, Butterfield 1959). Without entering into complex 
debates, it must be said that there always existed in the Muslim traditions of thinking currents 
that advocated rational interpretations of the Scriptures as well as the idea that there exists two 
orders of truth, one divine and the other mundane (e.g. Averroes; see Leaman 1998). It is also 
generally admitted that “Islamic science” started declining around the 15th century AD, partly 
due to the “rise of a clerical faction which froze this same science and withered its progress” 
(al-Hassan and Hill 1986). When arriving in the Muslim world, modern science received a 
reception very different from enlightenment advocates and from conservative circles. For our 
present purposes, it is interesting to note that for Muslim scientists like Mehdi Golshani (2003: 
52), it “was the transfer of various philosophical currents entangled with science that had a 
profound effect on the minds of Muslim scientists and intellectuals. Schools like Positivism and 
Darwinism penetrated the Muslim world and dominated its academic circles and had a 
noticeable impact on some Islamic theological doctrines.” 
Pure rejection of science has become rare in Muslim societies nowadays. On the other hand, 
after gaining some ground, attempts at substituting a scientific positivist worldview to the 
Islamic religious one retreated, to the point that it is often difficult to publicly present oneself 
as an atheist or even as an agnostic in most Muslim-majority countries. Contemporary Muslim 
attitudes vis-à-vis science can be categorized in four subgroups: those who seek to justify 
modern science on religious grounds; those who claim that the Qur’an had scientific 
foreknowledge; those who advocate the building of a new theology allowing the re-
interpretation of Islam in the light of modern science6; and finally those who separate the 
findings of modern science from its philosophical assumptions (Golshani 1998).  
Qur’anic scientific foreknowledge can be considered as a most widespread public 
understanding of the relationship between science and Islam in contemporary Muslim societies. 
One of its major proponents was the French physician Maurice Bucaille (1976) who claimed 
that the Qur’an does “not contain a single statement which is assailable from a modern scientific 
point of view”. This led him to the conclusion that the “facts” described in the Qur’an could not 
be have been authored by any human. The belief that Qur’an prophesized scientific theories 
and findings is widely popular: expansion of the universe, planetary motion, greenhouse effect, 
continental drift, and relativity are some of the many examples of what is claimed to have been 
predicted in the Islamic revelation. This is generally known as the “scientific miracle” (i‘jaz 
‘ilmi) of the Qur’an (Dallal 2004). Among those prophecies, there are claims and predictions 
which are taken to have anticipated future events which actually took place (e.g. the Persian 
defeat by the Byzantine army in 627 AD) or documented past events which remained ignored 
until modern archeological science excavated their material evidence (e.g. Moses’s traverse of 
the Red Sea; see infra).  
In the Muslim world, like elsewhere, some creationists attempted to reconcile science and 
religion through e.g. the rejection of Darwinian theories of evolution as “false science”. We 
must notice here that this viewpoint wrongly confounds biological and socio-cultural evolution 
under the same denomination of “Darwinism”. This explains why Harun Yahya, in his 
documentary on archeological evidence of the truth of Qur’an, which opposes any evolutionary 
                                                     
6 This is the case in the field of bioethics, where some scientists try to show how to read the scriptures in the 
light of the development of knowledge. See Dupret 2002 and Ghaly 2015. 
conception of religion, considers it relevant to target the author of The Origin of Species 
together with materialist thinkers like Marx. 
Some Muslim scholars signed the Discovery Institute’s A Scientific Dissent From 
Darwinism petition (Edis 1999). Intelligent Design’s conceptions of nature and the universe are 
widely respected among Muslims intellectuals and many ID books have been translated, in 
Turkey especially. Public meetings promoting ID were sometimes sponsored by the local 
government and ID prominent representatives were invited (Edis 2007). However, the term 
“intelligent design” is not much used by Muslim creationists to support their own assertions 
and it is even rejected by Harun Yahya as an "abstract and abstruse" way not to refer to God 
(Allah).  
It is in this context that must be situated the life and work of Harun Yahya, the author of the 
documentary film on which we focus below. Born in 1956, Harun Yahya (Adnan Oktar under 
his original name) is a Turkish advocate of i‘jaz ‘ilmi literature and of Islamic creationism.7 He 
became famous in Western countries in 2007 after having sent thousands of copies of his Atlas 
of Creation8 to scientists, politicians, museums and schools. He is the president of the Science 
Research Foundation (Bilim Araştırma Vakfı [BAV], established 1990), which promotes 
creationism, and the National Values Preservation Foundation (Milli Değerleri Koruma Vakfı 
[MDKV], established in 1995), which works on the promotion of moral values. Although he 
has himself no credentials as a specialist in Islamic theology, he is an adept of Said Nursi, an 
influential Muslim scholar whose Qur’an commentary includes a comprehensive political and 
religious ideology. He studied interior architecture at the Mimar Sinan University Academy of 
Fine Arts in Istanbul. As a Sunni zealot, he gathered around him young people belonging to 
socially-active and prosperous families of Istanbul who had become newly religious. According 
                                                     
7 See Wikipedia entry “Adnan Oktar”: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adnan_Oktar. 
8 The title is one good reason if any why one can speak of “Islamic creationism” as a member’s term. 
to Edip Yüksel (2005), he presented his teachings, “a refined and urbanized version of Said 
Nursi”, “to the children of the privileged class, without intimidating them.”9 He argued against 
Marxism and the Darwinian theory of Evolution because of its promoting materialism, atheism 
and derivative ideologies.10 In 1986 he enrolled in the Philosophy Department of Istanbul 
University, attracting many university students, mostly from the prestigious Bosphorus 
University. Adnan Oktar's name began to appear regularly in the press, sometimes in the 
headlines. The same year he published a book titled Judaism and Freemasonry claiming that 
state offices, universities, political groups and media were influenced by a “hidden group”. This 
was considered as an offense against the Turkish military regime and Oktar was arrested and 
charged with promoting a theocratic revolution for which he served a term in a prison and a 
mental hospital. 
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, Oktar’s group became more organized, while his 
message took on a Messianic form. He published many books and founded the Science 
Research Foundation, which targets “mass awareness concerning what the real underlying 
causes of social and political conflicts are.”11 Later, he established the Foundation for Protection 
of National Values. After the new military coup in 1999, Oktar was again arrested and charged 
with using threats for personal benefit and creating an organization with the intent to commit a 
crime, although the charges were eventually dismissed. Between that time and the present, BAV 
has organized hundreds of conferences on creationism in Turkey and worldwide. He built a 
large publishing enterprise with publications sold worldwide and even a TV channel. In 2010, 
                                                     
9 Nursi is known for having said that “scientific practice is the best religious practice, since scientific progress 
broadens our knowledge in God”; and “science and religion are the two pillars of the perfect man” (see Mardin 
1989). 
10 It must be noted that this combat against Darwin and Marxism is also linked to the use of these authors by 
Turkish leftist movements to sustain their political struggle. 
11 “About the SRF”. Srf-tr.org. Retrieved 10 April 2012. This campaign against secularism and in favor or the 
return to religious values in public life is a feature Harun Yahya shares with ID promoters. 
Oktar was selected as one of the top fifty most influential Muslims in the world by the Royal 
Islamic Strategic Studies Centre of Jordan. 
Adnan Oktar’s penname, Harun Yahya, refers to the Biblical figure of Aaron and to the New 
Testament one of John the Baptist. It reflects his insistence on God’s unicity (tawhid) and effort 
to teach to non-believers Islam as the seal of all prophecies. On his website, Harun Yahya 
exposes a genealogical tree relating him to Islam’s Prophet Muhammad. All his books on 
science-related topics stress the might, sublimity, and majesty of God. A sub-set of this 
production aims at the critique of materialism, evolution, Darwinism, and atheism. Harun 
Yahya’s books are lavishly produced, on good-quality paper with abundant full-color 
illustrations, and are often made into high-resolution videos freely downloadable on the 
Internet. The close relationship between Christian and Islamic creationisms dates back to the 
1980s. For many years Oktar drew on the writings of Christian creationists to develop his case 
against evolution. His work became more and more similar to ID and his website was listed as 
an “Islamic intelligent design” website by the Discovery Institute (Harrison 2010). Under the 
BAV’s umbrella Oktar launched many campaigns against Darwinian theories, but their funding 
remains unknown. The most famous campaign of this kind started with the publication of 
Yaratılış Atlası (The Atlas of the Creation) in 2006 and 2007, accompanied by a dedicated 
website. Tens of thousands of copies of the book have been delivered throughout Europe and 
the United States. It received unanimous disapproval from the academic community. Gerdien 
de Jong, a biologist at Utrecht University who received a copy of the book, has described its 
reasoning as “absurdly ridiculous” (Enserink 2007: 925a). Today, Harun Yahya is a brand 
which mobilizes amazing production machinery. His website addresses a broad audience in 
many languages, presents more than 100 documentary films, and offers a selection of 50 books. 
He is also the head of a TV channel which features him, some would say, in a quasi-Prophetic 
stance (Solberg 2013: 8). In the field of archeology, Harun Yahya selects events alluded to in 
the Qur’an, something which gives them some independent historical credibility that science is 
asked to confirm. 
The script 
Harun Yahya’s documentary film provides us with a perspicuous example of a creationist 
usage of science. Although Darwinian and materialist doctrines are targeted in many segments 
of the film, as the two faces of the same atheistic coin, evolutionism is not the primary enemy 
of this production; instead, the film is more about the scientific verification of historical events 
reported in the Qur'an. One finds here the classical ingredients of what was ironically called 
pseudo-archeology (e.g. Feder 1996, Stoczkowski 1999, Fagan 2006, Le Quellec 2011): claims 
suggesting, more than proving; conclusions which are stated, more than argued; scant and 
partial state of the art; cosmologic theses. However, we are not interested in sorting out the right 
and the wrong in this production. What we look for is the description of the arguments which 
make it an attempt at scientifically validating the Qur’an. This raises questions as to the nature 
of religion and science in their public understanding, their epistemic status, their capacity to 
consolidate each other, and eventually the paradigmatic shift making their accommodation 
possible. 
The documentary film we analyze is easily accessible via Harun Yahya’s website 
(http://www.harunyahya.com/en). Titled “Evidence for the true faith in historical sources”, it is 
composed of pictures excerpted from fiction, animated and archive movies, as well as maps and 
archeological objects. Accordingly, it functions as a photographic album in which a series of 
pages/slides succeed each other. Every slide is accompanied by a text read and eventually 
subtitled. The whole film is dramatically set to music typical of peplum movies or videogames 
(in the manner of Age of Empires). 
The film’s script has a simple structure. Raising some historical enigmas, it claims they were 
solved through recent archeological research. Then it states its central thesis, which is that these 
truths established by science confirm the truths already established in the Qur’an. Four chapters 
are dedicated to sustaining this thesis: Ebla’s tablets, Mount Nimrod, Egypt’s seven plagues, 
Pharaoh’s crossing of the Red Sea. The conclusion invites the spectator, on the basis of these 
chapters, “to see the evident signs”, which is a direct quotation of the Qur’an (al-ayatu al-
mubina). Here is an excerpt of the introductory sequence: 
How were Pharaoh and his army drowned? / […] What was the hidden truth in the tablets of Ebla? / […] 
Historical sources and archeological findings continue to reveal the accuracy of the descriptions given in the 
Qur’an. / One of the most distinct miracles of the Quran is the accuracy of information in the verses that reveal 
historical events.  Contemporary archeological findings and historical sources confirm the events as revealed in 
the verses of the Quran.   / […] Thanks to contemporary archival research and archeological discoveries, just about 
all these events described in the Qur’an have become “visible” and “knowable.” / In this film, we will examine 
some of the results of modern archeological investigations and historical sources that will highlight and provide 
evidence for the emergence of the truth as revealed by the verses of the Quran.   / At the same time, we will witness 
the manifestation of Almighty Allah’s promise in the Qur’an. / Say: ‘Praise be to Allah. He will show you His 
Signs and you will recognize them… ’ (Surat an-Naml, 93) 
The introduction thus takes the following pattern: historical enigmas, scientific answers, 
Qur’an confirmation. It is already interesting to notice that the scheme is so conceived that it is 
the science which states the truth and the Qur’an which confirms it, and not the other way 
around, although elsewhere the questions are raised in the sacred text and answered by 
archeology. Each case is presented as one chapter of a volume concerning the convergence 
between archeological science and revealed truth.  
The first chapter concerning Ebla’s tablets proceeds in the following way. It starts by stating 
its argument: rehearsal of the tablets’ discovery; mention in these tablets of three prophetic 
names long before their mention in the Torah; truth of divine scriptures. This argument is then 
repeated point by point in a way that does not refine it but expands upon each of its parts. First, 
regarding the tablets, some elements are given about the conditions of their excavation, the 
history of Ebla kingdom, the deciphering of the Eblite language, the importance of the 
discovery. Secondly, to the names of Abraham, David and Ismail given in introduction, it adds 
the identification of places (Sinai, Gaza, Jerusalem, Sodom, Gomorrah, Irem), that all share the 
particularity of not having been named except in religious texts. Thirdly, it comes out of the 
syllogism that documentary truth confirms divine truth, but also that the human religious mind 
always believed in the one God and has therefore no evolutionary character, contrary to the 
theses Harun Yahya attributes to Darwinian theories. The chapter concludes with a citation 
from the Qur’an. 
The second chapter deals with the existence of the text Abraham received from God and 
which is supposed to be buried on Mount Nimrod. It starts with the statement that “historical 
and archeological discoveries show that the Middle East was a pagan region in the time of the 
Prophet Abraham.” However, right after and contrary to the former chapter, it gives the Islamic 
narrative regarding Abraham’s prophecy, according to which God sent texts down to him. The 
film claims that “it is the Qur’an12 that gives us the most accurate information about the prophet 
Abraham.” Then comes the archeological part of the argument. This is purely hypothetical, as 
these texts were never discovered and are only “believed to lie within the 2500-year-old remains 
on Mount Nimrod, in the region of Adiyaman in South-East Turkey.” Nevertheless, the film 
goes on saying that “it may well be that a future investigation using advanced technology will 
uncover these highly important historical documents.” This claim is said to be grounded on 
evidence coming from historical sources and archeological excavations, as recognized by 
                                                     
12 The parallel one can draw between the Qur’an and the Bible is evident here. However, Harun Yahya does not 
refer to the latter, but only to the former. It must be reminded that, in classical Islamic doctrine, Muhammad is 
presented as the Seal of all prophecies and the Qur’an as the direct Word of God, which corrected all what 
preceded. 
UNESCO. In particular, one is told there is a consensus among archeologists about the existence 
of a tomb chamber inside the mountain itself, where “the discoveries to be made can be expected 
to reveal very important information concerning the history of religions.” 
The story of the seven plagues of Egypt constitutes the third chapter, which starts with 
papyruses and hieroglyphs, and their translation in the 19th century after the discovery of the 
Rosetta stone. One specific papyrus, written by Ipuwer, conserved in Leiden and translated by 
Gardiner in 1909, is deemed to reveal that his author had personally witnessed the plagues. The 
crux of this chapter is that “the historical information in the papyrus regarding the disasters that 
struck the people of Egypt was in complete agreement with the reports given in the Qur’an” in 
Surat al-A‘raf. The documentary proceeds then to the comparison between Ipuwer’s 
admonitions and relevant verses of the Qur’an, with the conclusion that “this papyrus, the 
contents of which only came to light in the 20th century, is exceedingly important evidence that 
once again shows how the Qur’an is truly the word of our Lord.” 
The fourth and last chapter deals with “the secret of the Prophet Moses’ crossing of the Red 
Sea.” It starts with the quotation of verses 63-68 of Surat al-Shu‘ara: “Strike the sea with your 
staff.’ And it split in two, each part like a towering cliff. And We brought the others right up to 
it. We rescued Moses and all those who were with him. Then We drowned the rest. There is 
certainly a sign in that yet most of them didn’t believe. Truly your Lord is the Almighty, the 
Most Merciful.” This miracle was the subject of considerable research, which was eventually 
“scientifically explained” with a “mathematical” account of how the rock bed was laid bare as 
the winds pushed the water aside, and published in the Bulletin of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences. The conclusion of the chapter is that God, because of His compassion and support for 
believers, can decide at His choosing to produce a miracle in which all scientific conditions are 
met. 
The documentary film concludes with the repetition of its master-idea: “Being able to see 
the evident signs”: 
Throughout the course of history our Almighty Lord has sent envoys to show people the true path, some of 
whom are referred to in Holy Scriptures from His Own Presence. / […] The information contained within the 
divine scriptures that appeared nowhere else when these holy scriptures  were revealed are corroborated by 
historical documents that have only been brought to light using modern technology in recent archeological 
discoveries and research. / […] These proofs corroborate the testimony of the Qur’an.  These proofs are important 
and will greatly excite believers and increase their faith and enthusiasm.13 / In the Qur’an our Almighty Lord has 
promised that He will show people such proofs both in their own natures and in the outside world: / We will show 
them Our Signs on the horizon and within themselves until it is clear to them that it is the truth. Is it not enough 
for your Lord that He is a witness of everything? (Surat al-Fussilat, 53) 
In sum, historical and archeological discoveries are used to corroborate the Qur’an, which 
itself testifies to God and His truth (the God-Truth, al-Haqq), Whose evidences can be found 
in Humanity (the topic of this documentary film) as well as in Nature (the topic of many other 
documentaries). These evidences are the “evident signs” revealed by God, something that 
means both the signifying and the signified, as the Arabic word “ayat” refers to the evidence as 
well as to the Qur’an verses which reveal divine evidence. 
Categorization and authority 
Many techniques are used in the documentary so as to give its general claims an authoritative 
status. It is often done in an intertextual way, which intertwines expert speech and the divine 
word, the truth of the former drawing from, or supporting, the truth of the latter, and the other 
way around. Through the embedding of their respective voices, authority effects are not only 
produced but also reinforced.  
                                                     
13 One sees here incidentally that the audience which is targeted is not only composed of non-believers but also 
of believers needing scientific support to their faith. 
The documentary genre is characterized by a specific language and grammar. It plays on 
intertwined repertoires of reality, truth and plausibility, allowing quick shifts to and from one 
another. In the way it associates pictures, voice, texts and music in a sequence, and it also 
produces a “natural intelligibility”. Indeed, this film creates a structure of relevance directly 
(though perhaps imperfectly) available to an ordinarily competent audience. Such an audience 
understands this normatively/morally organized documentary through normatively/morally 
constituted sense-making practices. Our analysis of the structure of intelligibility of this 
science-and-religion movie shows how it produces, and is produced by, a master narrative 
whose interpretative method is reflexive, that is, retrospectively grounded on what is “known 
in common” and prospectively oriented to the further inferences it makes possible. This film is 
meant to be watched and understood, and it is even over-determined (Livingston 1995) in that 
respect. It is directly accessible to “ordinarily competent” viewers, who see it with their 
everyday epistemic resources (Jayyusi 1984: 289). This is accentuated by the fact that it does 
not engage into subtle epistemological distinctions between facts, theories and evidence, but on 
the contrary conflates the lexicons of reality, truth and probability in one and the same register. 
Taken in isolation, actions-within-pictures have both a “glance-availability” and an 
independent trajectory. Carefully studying at time t0 an object through the prism of a 
microscope comprehends the evident though invisible idea that there was a specimen to study 
at time t-1 and implicates the evident though invisible idea that there is a scientific outcome of 
this examination at time t+1. This Gestalt structure triggers categorization devices reaching far 
beyond direct visual availability (Jayyusi 1991). In our example, it carries a knowledge 
categorization device following which a material puzzle can be solved through the use of 
scientific techniques. These ‘one-shot narratives’ have a kind of allusiveness which animates 
what is made visible within the frame. A scientific glance is not a simple glance; it is a glance 
that leads to outcomes which must be taken as true. In other words, all these photographs are 
not read in a vacuum; there is always some context that provides for what is intended by the 
author, for the readability of the film. For instance, selecting the channel or the website on 
which I watch the film is a constraining feature of my watching this film: it provides for the 
context of this film’s intelligibility, while simultaneously, the film itself provides for the 
channel’s or website’s categorization. 
The many pictures are ordered in a sequential way, i.e. in juxtaposition with each other for 
the specific purposes of the film. For instance, one realizes that not only is Pharaoh’s army 
engaged in the pursuit of Moses and the Hebrews, and facing its subsequent drowning into the 
floods of the Red Sea, but also that this little sequence is itself embedded within a broader 
narrative, which is also sequentially organized and tells us that, in a geographically identified 
place, an historical event took place, and that this event is accounted for in the Qur’an and 
scientifically explained by oceanographers, which shows in conclusion that what is said in the 
Prophetic revelation can be proven scientifically. These sequences are both distinct from, and 
constitutive of, the global narrative. It reveals how far the whole product is a laminated object, 
with the many implicit and explicit trajectories of shots, sequences and global narrative 
intertwined in a complex grammar.  
If shots convey a proper meaning that is embedded in their piecemeal and sequential 
organization, the sum of these sequences thus produces a global narrative, which can be 
summarized as: “there are things which are told in the Qur’an; these things are scientifically 
confirmed or explained; therefore the Qur’an is scientifically true and science is religiously 
valid.14 This global narrative should be understood in terms of a Gestalt production, that is, the 
unfolding of some details in a story which gain prominence according to their significance in 
the understanding of the general whole, while other details are confined to the background and 
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actually disappear from the narrative. For instance, one can see pictures of several excavations 
and archeological discoveries whose specifics (who, when, what) can be forgotten (although 
they can be more or less easily recognized) provided that we understand them as delineating 
the whole scheme of archeology at work to show historical truth. Some details of the many 
shots and sequences take a particular relevance because of the place they occupy and the 
function they achieve within the global narrative, while other details do not and are therefore 
discarded. 
Our documentary film presents itself as a puzzle-solution device (Heritage and Greatbatch, 
1986). By combining words and pictures, the movie sets up a puzzle in the minds of the 
spectators. Then, progressively, it presents the elements which together provide for the solution. 
These elements are organized in a syllogistic way: (1) factual discoveries made by archeology 
(or stories narrated in the Qur’an); (2) Qur’an’s foreknowledge of these facts (or scientific 
factualizing of these stories); (3) science and Qur’an confirm each other.15 The three-part 
structure of the syllogism and the simple character of the message invite an alignment of both 
editor and audience on the type of narrative they expect from each other. When the syllogism 
ends with a Qur’anic verse, its positioning makes it the lens through which all that precedes has 
to be read—one might call it, paraphrasing Garfinkel (1967), a documentary method of 
understanding of an Islamic kind. However, it is sometimes science that concludes the 
syllogism. In that case, one can reasonably argue that the documentary method of understanding 
is more of a scientist’s kind.  
As explicitly stated in its title, “Evidence of the true faith” aims at promoting one specific 
narrative, which we call, following Lynch and Bogen (1996), a master-narrative. Imposing one 
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Popper attacked. In arguments in the USA about Christian creationism, Popper was frequently invoked to 
dismiss such confirmation of Biblical events. 
master-narrative is no self-evident undertaking but a contested process. Of course, there can be 
many coexisting master-narratives but only in separate spheres of relevance. A master-narrative 
is established against the background of other preexisting and possible or reasonable narratives. 
In our case, Evolutionist and Materialist narratives constitute this straw enemy. Indeed, in a sort 
of mirror game, a master-narrative is necessarily the counter-narrative of another master-
narrative. It does not mean that the scripts of opposed master-narratives prove completely 
different from one another. Actually, this creationist documentary shares with its avowed 
enemy, i.e. evolutionist theories, the same valuation of science (to the point that we 
characterized it as scientistic). Therefore, it is not the idea of science that is at stake, but its 
combination with religion (which is at best indifferent to non-religious documentary 
producers), and, even more important, the incumbents of “good/true science” (“bad/wrong 
science” being the science that denies evidences of the true faith as provided by both good 
science and religious scriptures). 
The documentary genre constitutes a remarkable truth-stating engine. It is able to produce 
its intelligibility in an organized manner and with persuasion techniques which draw upon 
narratives naturally grounded in reality. Although it is the outcome of montage, it pretends to 
describe reality through e.g. the use of (a) categorizations, (b) the embedding of “naturally-
captured” sequences, (c) the referring to “plausible fiction”, and (d) the soliciting of “expertise”. 
a) Throughout the whole documentary, categorization devices operate to produce truth 
effects. Many categorizations are used to index persons, collectivities, objects, events, 
activities, etc. They are often organized in collections of items perceived as sharing family 
resemblances. For instance, Pharaoh is combined with pagan; sky, clouds and mountains with 
God; a pointing finger with scientific demonstration; journal titles with accuracy. These 
categories are situationally selected according to praxiological criteria of adequacy (a 
frightened face illustrates well the suffering of ancient Egyptians), the recipient-designed 
configuration (the audience to which the documentary is addressed), and the implicative 
potential (the use of technology) indicates the accuracy of findings. In sum, it is an issue of 
assembling items in a way which is relevant for the purposes of the narrative. 
Categorization devices are organized according to two major axes: relationships and 
knowledge. One finds firstly the collections of categories organized in relational pairs (e.g. 
“Muslims/pagans”, “labs/scientists”), that is, doublets referring to relations between persons, 
things, or persons and things. Secondly, collections organized around knowledge associate 
scholars and laypeople. The former are the owners, because of their knowledge, of special or 
exclusive rights in the dealing with specific issues, like the explanation of a natural 
phenomenon. The latter categories, in our case, do not appear on screen but are assigned the 
status of the film’s targeted audience. The categories of a collection are (potentially) descriptive 
(for instance: an archeologist at a dig is capable of making discoveries). They are also 
inferentially adequate: moral qualities, rights and duties can be ascribed to category members 
on this basis (especially the scientist’s contribution to truth finding). And they have a 
programmatic relevance: the failure to respect of rights or duties incumbent to the category 
constitutes a noticeable breach (for instance, the lack of humility of ancient Egyptians violates 
their duties vis-à-vis God and infers the motives of His visiting doom upon them). 
Several issues follow from this organization around categorizations: conventional 
implications of the selections operated (e.g.: pointing to science implicates accuracy); 
inferential consequences of the selections operated (e.g.: Nimrod’s lack of humility invites 
Abraham’s ridicule of him); and the use of categorial knowledge in the production of 
descriptions (e.g.: categorizing ancient Egyptian people as pagans describes them as the normal 
incumbents of God’s anger). We thus see how activities are category bound: there is a way in 
which their accomplishment by their incumbents is expected and considered as adequate. Hence 
too, the fact that striving for scientific truth is a duty linked to the category of being a good 
Muslim. 
Membership categorizations proceed in a way which is both moral and normative. This is 
the case of prejudices and stereotypes, whose functioning is transitive: some member of a 
categorial group is considered as its representative, although it is not an organized community, 
and is ascribed all of its features and is therefore bound to the attributes commonly associated 
to this category. In our film, being characterized as a pagan, a Muslim or a scientist makes of 
the person the owner of the generic properties of this group. Of course, the ascription of a 
collective predicate to some knowledge or doctrinal corpus is not an issue of empirically valid 
imputation, but the establishment of a property relationship (Sharrock 1974). The attribute 
given to the corpus is rather a descriptive device. One might speak of a halo of descriptive 
relevance (Dupret 2011). Characterizing science as conforming to Islam or Islam as conforming 
to science opens the semantic field as well as it creates a programmatic relevance. 
There is a whole moral grammar operating here, composed of identities, causes, motives, 
from which a web of meanings proceeds under the guise of informing, documenting and 
reporting. This grammar is often organized around disjunctive pairs, like for instance 
“blind/perspicuous”. The choice of one part of the pair rather than the other has such 
implications that subsequent discourse can be inferred and managed consequently. Indeed, each 
part of this categorial pair conveys a bunch of conventional presuppositions such as: “fake 
evidence → bad science → blind to truth → materialist”; or “right evidence → good science 
→ perspicuous to truth → Muslim”. The choice of a category is thus not only descriptive, but 
also implies certain commitments in terms of belief, which are contradictory, with all the 
epistemic consequences deriving from it. In this perspective, it is not difficult to show that what 
demarcates Harun Yahya’s creationism from his supposedly Darwinian enemies is not the 
rejection of science but the equivalence he draws between religious signs and scientific proof, 
turning that equivalence into a criterion for what constitutes right and fake evidence. 
evolutionist theories creationist theories 
looking for evidence 
seeing the signs 
fake evidence/bad science right evidence/good science 
blind/denying religious signs perspicuous/accepting religious signs 
materialism Islam 
b) Reality and truth effects16 are also produced throughout the film. We find the former in 
the embedding of “naturally-captured” pictures and sequences. This is the case in the different 
scenes in which an archeologist is engaged in the action of discovering or an epigraphist in the 
action of deciphering. The “Evidence of the true faith” documentary is based on many pictures 
excerpted from archives that were not taken for the purpose of the film itself. Their leaning on 
the truth-value of documentary images actually increases their evidentiary power, since they 
cannot be discarded as mere staging, but are on the contrary grounded in historical events and 
real-time coverage. By so doing, pictures in the spot give the impression of accounting for the 
real, instead of creating a fiction. 
In our film, voice (and subtitles) and images are joined in a sequential and intertextual 
framework in order to produce the documentary, i.e. the documented argument. Actually, the 
image is found to be confined to the role of paraphrase and commentary on the narration. 
                                                     
16 Reality effects are these visual and textual devices through which a narrative conveys the impression that what 
takes place in e.g. a film is related to our common, familiar world, while truth effects are devices of the same 
kind through which the narrative seeks to persuade the audience that what is said can be trusted or believed in. 
Both effects are intimately related and serve similar functions and purposes. See also Barthes (1968). 
However, this technically ancillary status of the image in no way detracts from the fact that it 
plays a fundamental role in the film, which is that of confirmation and accreditation of the 
stories related by the narration. Original images seem to come in directly, without mediation, 
so that our senses are able to perceive things as if we were in the location and in the place of 
the camera. The technology that supports every filming operation tends to erase the conditions 
endogenous to its production, so much and so well that the document produced appears, finally, 
natural, obvious, and self-validating. 
c) As for truth effects, they also produced through the use of fictional pictures. The staging 
of mythical places, people and prototypes has the capacity to induce their historicity. This is 
achieved by the embedding of sequences excerpted from cinema movies of a realistic style. 
Realistic does not mean historically accurate; it refers to the production of the many features 
that make it easy for the spectator to locate the place, the time and the story in which it takes 
place. It relates the spectator to what is known in common: Pharaohs heading the two crowns 
of Upper and Lower Egypt; Roman soldiers protected by easily recognizable helmets and 
armor; Biblical prophets wearing long beards and holding a staff; etc. These are not necessarily 
historically or archeologically validated characteristics of ancient societies, but they correspond 
to the stereotypes surrounding them and, because of this redundancy, confirm their reality.  
There are fact-establishment practices consisting of recursive stances of accounting for the 
same story, with the same personages and the same details concurring in the production of an 
iconic picture of some past reality. The reality-like nature of these fictions is conditional upon 
their capacity to induce their likeliness and plausibility. Nobody doubts that Zefirelli’s staging 
of the life of Christ is not an historical account; it is nevertheless organized in a way that makes 
it possible to consider it as an authentic perspective, a probing fiction. We all know that every 
detail of the film is created, articulated, staged and edited, but the assemblage of all these details 
leads to the production of a Gestalt picture which tells us a story whose face value fits our 
culturally spontaneous expectations (see Veyne 1983: 32). 
d) The documentary enumerates things that “do exist”, which are anchored in reality. It is 
grounded on “expertise” through the quotation of scholars, short sequences showing scientists 
at work, archives of archeological excavations, pictures of historical and archeological artifacts, 
3D reconstitutions, maps, etc. There are many references made to the scientific community. 
Names are quoted, like Giovanni Pettitano, the specialist of Ebla, “who is an expert in ancient 
writing at Rome University”, Alan Henderson Gardiner, who translated the Ipuwer papyri, or 
the Russian mathematicians Volzinger and Androsov, who “provided mathematical proof of 
the possibility of the Prophet Moses’ (pbuh)17 dividing of the Red Sea”. Through their scientific 
achievements, these scientists made knowledge available to lay viewers, and reference is made 
to “actual” articles or books which “do exist” and can be consulted, as illustrated by the cover 
pages of various publications (Reader’s Digest magazine, Bulletin of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences) which are accumulated and therefore cumulate their probing force. Accuracy is 
achieved through the indexing of time (e.g. the discovery of Ebla tablets took place in 1975) 
and place via the use of maps, like the one locating the Kingdom of Ebla, which “consisted of 
part of south-eastern Turkey and part of Mesopotamia and extended as far as south of 
Damascus, in Syria”. Quotations from the manuscripts (Ebla archives, Ipuwer papyri) also 
testify to the scientificity of what is claimed. Finally, quantitative data are also used to lend 
credibility to what is said (e.g. “The importance of this discovery was highlighted when a library 
consisting of 20,000 tablets and fragments written in cuneiform were found ‘; “around 600,000 
could then have crossed the 7 kilometers to the other side in some 4 hours”); and hyperbolic 
statements as to the importance of specific discoveries (e.g. “The discovery of the Kingdom of 
Ebla in 1975 was regarded as one of the greatest and most important discoveries of classical 
                                                     
17 Abbreviation meaning in English-written Islamic texts: “Peace be upon him!” 
archeology”; “The area is today regarded by many international organizations, including 
UNESCO, as one of the world’s most important cultural treasure houses”) serve to stress the 
force of the argument justifying the production of this film and guiding its organization. 
The use of the “scientific voice” incorporates the authority of expertise to assert the validity 
of the truth claims which are proffered in the film; it contributes to the surplus of veracity about 
what is claimed by the film director. The inclusion of scientific reported speech allows the film 
director to attribute the authority of his argument to an instance whose authority is 
unchallengeable since it is deemed to reflect things as they are and not as one thinks they are. 
In that respect, much depends on the establishment of the expert’s credibility. It can even be 
said that the expert’s credibility functions as a substitute for truth (Lynch 1998). What is said 
is true because it was said by somebody whose status implies that (s)he says true things, 
although it often appears that expertise proceeds from commonsense techniques rather than 
from a scientific knowledge proving what it claims. In other words, expertise is a major resource 
of the documentary, which in turn transforms it into an expert account. All the commonsense 
features of science, expertise and scientists are mobilized in order to give the spectator access 
to knowledge as if being oneself an expert at work. 
The documentary consists in the production of a narrative thread of relevance which, through 
the association of ideas, inferences and connotations, gives the spectator an authoritative 
argument to which (s)he cannot but eventually subscribe. Different artifacts contribute to the 
factuality of the claims; various scientific testimonies contribute to their validity. At the end, 
the documentary produces a normative account which presents itself as an evident truth, all the 
less challengeable that it proceeds from the sum of “evidences” preceding the conclusion. 
Through the iteration of correspondence between what is claimed, showed and said, it produces 
veracity and authenticity, whatever the techniques and assumptions underlying these 
authoritative statements. 
Relevance is achieved through iteration. Since Schütz (1990), we know that relevance is not 
inherent in nature as such but the result of human selective and interpretative activity. 
Documentaries are the product of a practice of selection, production, ordering and 
hierarchization of “real” information. Various techniques are mobilized for this purpose, and 
contribute to the production of an instructed relevance; that is, an order imposed in such a way 
that the film seems to proceed from the factual objectivity of natural and historical truths. To 
be sure, this relevance can only operate in the context of a background of understanding shared 
by the film director and his audience. At the same time, it is Harun Yahya who, by means of 
his website and documentary films, produces this background. In that sense, the film is 
organized in a way which both documents its argument and is documented by the type of 
reasoning from which it proceeds and to which it orients. 
Redundant, cumulative truth 
Seeing The Evident Signs is a documentary film seeking to show that science and Qur’an, 
far from opposing, actually duplicate each other, as alternative versions of the same truth. In 
that sense, they do not constitute different truth programs – science and Islam – but only one 
and the same – science-qua-Islam – which presents itself as a paradigmatic shift from its self-
ascribed enemy: materialism. There is only one truth, which is exposed in Qur’an: “good 
science” is the science which is redundant with this truth, it is therefore Qur’anic science. In 
that sense, science comes here to confirm Islamic revelation. However, many aspects of Qur’an 
cannot be understood outside the frame of science; they need science as their interpretive key. 
In that second sense, it is Islamic revelation which confirms a scientific truth. In this last section, 
we firstly examine this conception of science, Islam, and science-qua-Islam; secondly we 
consider the extent to which this is a kind of scientism, which therefore shares with other type 
of scientisms an argumentative family resemblance. 
Most of Harun Yahya’s documentary films address issues of science in their capacity to 
corroborate (as in the case of Ebla tablets), explain (the case of Moses’ crossing of the Red Sea) 
or document (the case of Ipuwer papyri) what the Qur’an has literally revealed. In other words, 
it is the convergence and even the redundancy of these two truth programs that is stressed. It is 
often postulated that science and religion oppose each other, and there are indeed many 
historical situations where, like in ancient Greece, “the field of knowledge was turned upside 
down by the creation of new powers of affirmation (historical investigation and speculative 
physics) that competed with myth and, unlike it, expressly offered the alternative between true 
and false” (Veyne 1988: 24). However, this is not the case with Seeing The Evident Signs, which 
stages the two sides of one and the same coin: truth. In other words, Qur’an and science do tell 
us the same, although in a different way and style. Harun Yahya’s conception of science is 
positivist, cumulative and unidirectional. It corresponds to this a-historical and formalistic 
philosophy of science, which Kuhn (1962) systematically denies (Hacking 1983; Sharrock and 
Read 2002). Harun Yahya sees science as a stockpiling of results advancing towards the full 
and final truth (to the point that, if it is not yet the case that some point is scientifically proven, 
it is said that it will be the case). Science is hypostatized, its findings are non-contradictory, its 
truth is unquestionable; it is the access to the one and unique Truth. As science is a device used 
to prove Qur’an’s truth, it cannot be but true. It could not have the status of evidence of divine 
truth if it was not as true as the Qur’an. Like God, science is almighty, it is the truth, unique 
and exclusive of alternates.  
One faces a resolutely “modern” way of reasoning by which the authority of divine 
revelation is supported by the scientific magister (see e.g. the excerpt where it is said that it 
“shows how the Qur’an is truly the word of our Lord”). The Qur’an is presented as being in 
need of science to show that it is true. This is pure materialism: strange phenomena are not 
miracles but scientific facts. They only seem unnatural, but there is necessarily a scientific 
explanation. Actually, it is only the Qur’an which is miraculous, as it reveals things that were 
otherwise unknowable at that time. Religion is looked upon in a positivist manner. The text of 
the Qur’an is presented as a scientific article positing a positive truth. Qur’an verses are quoted 
as pieces of evidence. The quotation of the Qur’an is equivalent to a bibliographical reference. 
Actually, Harun Yahya has a conception of religion which is equivalent to that of Frazer (1894) 
or Evans-Pritchard (1965) regarding magic. Our point is of course not to equate these two 
authors, and even less to caricature Evans-Pritchard's sophisticated approach to the Zande 
oracle. However, it is worth mentioning that, according to the latter, magic is a conception of 
nature which is both theoretical (its functioning) and technical (its mastery). The difference 
with Harun Yahya is that, whereas Frazer and Evans-Pritchard take magic as an error whose 
detection leads ultimately to the emergence of science – “a golden key that opens many locks 
in the treasury of nature” (Frazer 1894: Ch.69 §4) – Harun Yahya considers the Qur’an as a 
truth that the emergence of science eventually corroborates. But Frazer, Evans-Pritchard and 
Yahya all consider religion as an attempt at explaining the world; they share a proto-scientific 
conception of religion. They look at religion through the lens of positivist-scientific thinking. 
Religion is not taken as a specific language game embedded within a particular form of life 
(Wittgenstein 2000) or as a practice through which humans acknowledge contingency (Winch 
2007), but as a hypothetic-deductive, quasi-scientific formulation which is either wrong 
(Frazer, Evans-Pritchard) or true (Yahya), but is nevertheless in an internal relationship of 
coherence within the same language as science. In sum, Harun Yahya’s conception was made 
possible by the emergence of modern science and the window to a positivist philosophy of 
religion it opens. Incidentally, it shows that Frazer’s and Evans-Pritchard’s conceptions of 
magic and religion, which were rightly criticized by Wittgenstein and Winch as promoting 
mistaken general theories and categories, do nevertheless correspond to particular 
understandings of religion which specifically appeared in the wake of positivism. To be sure, 
this kind of religious positivism is possible only in relation to scriptures whose meaning can be 
presented as scientific foreknowledge in an unfalsifiable way.18 
In Harun Yahya’s terms, Qur’an and science are different paths leading to the same truth. 
Contrary to the legendary worlds of the ancient Greeks, which “were accepted as true in the 
sense that they were not doubted, but they were not accepted the way that everyday reality is” 
(Veyne 1983: 17), Yahya’s believes in Islam as he believes in science, because they both belong 
to the same truth, that of Nature qua God’s will. God is here the creator of everything, including 
nature and its intelligibility through science; including the world and its intelligibility through 
the Qur’an. God offers to humans the signs to see the truth of both Qur’an and science. These 
signs are evident, they are there, under our eyes; it suffices to see. It follows thereof that science 
and Qur’an cannot contradict each other as they both proceed from the same will of God to give 
us the capacity to see. Via these two ways, we see the same thing, which is the Creator’s work 
as He wants us to see it. It is a “prochronical” explanation in the sense of a creation imagined 
by God in a full-fledged way, as in Ph.H. Gosse’s Omphalos (see Gould 1985). Note that neither 
scientific nor religious truth is submitted to the other’s critique, as they both function in an 
autonomous way. When they meet, it is to duplicate their respective truth. Otherwise, it is 
considered as false science, in the same way as there are false religions. And in this scheme, 
archeology is solicited in order to confirm Qur’an’s truth, even when it has not yet achieved its 
discovery, on the argument that, when the discovery will take place, it will naturally confirm 
the truth already established in the Qur’an. In other words, whereas the Qur’an has scientific 
foreknowledge, science has an evidential power through anticipation. In this way, the argument 
is unfalsifiable, since any further discovery cannot take place, except in the sense of confirming 
the initial hypothesis: science makes or will make “events described in the Qur’an … ‘visible’ 
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2014), the latter including an excellent essay by M. Le Du. 
and ‘knowable’.” Consequently, believers have all the more reason to believe: “The Qur’an is 
such a scripture that there is no doubt”; “The unearthing of these historical documents and 
scientific evidence regarding the truth of these reports, reveal another miraculous aspect of the 
Holy Quran”. 
Harun Yahya’s creationism proposes a positivist, scientistic conception of science and 
religion to the point that one can speak of science-qua-religion.19 It has a cumulative, 
unfalsifiable, one-truth-oriented quasi-bigoted understanding of science: facts are scientifically 
established and thus exist objectively, independent of any context of valuation. At the same 
time, it proposes an interpretive paradigm in which every single empirical piece is ascribed a 
place in a puzzle whose design is God-made though literally accessible through the Qur’an. To 
put it in a nutshell, it is a speculative assemblage of material evidence. More exactly, it is “retro-
speculative” in the sense that it claims its design was already exposed, though not fully 
understood: it is not about looking for something hidden, but about discerning the features and 
contours of something formerly revealed. It does not directly manipulate its data, but it takes 
attitudinal and interpretive stances to them (Zaunbrecher 2012: 523). This is why one can speak 
of an interpretive paradigm, which leaves the raw data intact.  
This type of creationism stresses and exploits a dividing line between non-speculative, 
applied science (one might speak of technology), whose achievements are unquestionable and 
can be implemented; and speculative, more theoretical science, whose findings can only take 
the shape of theories and can never be totally proven. In the latter case, there is a hypothetical 
space which leaves room for alternate narratives, whatever the quality of their documentation. 
Harun Yahya’s creationism expresses a dogmatic belief in positive science, while taking a 
selective stance toward speculative science as it either recognizes the evident signs of God's 
                                                     
19 It can be compared to Boyle’s conception, according to which the greatness of God can be empirically 
assessed since the invariant laws created by God can be discovered and studied by science (see Gould 1998). 
design (and is therefore true: true science and true religion) or does not recognize them (and is 
therefore wrong: unscientific science, no religion or wrong religion) (see also Hildering et al. 
2012). Any kind of evolutionism – be it biological, social or religious – belongs to this latter 
category of erroneous, misleading, lying, ideological pretense at science.  
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